Abstract

Central Sahelian states of Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger have adopted multifaceted counter-insurgency (COIN) strategies, ranging from military offensives to community engagement, to combat violent extremism. Transitional governments have prioritized military restructuring. In Mali, this led to the recapture of the strategic northern town of Kidal from an alliance of predominantly Tuareg armed groups known as the Cadre Stratégique Permanent (CSP) in 2023, and Solenzo in western Burkina Faso was recaptured by the Burkinabe military. While these operations have achieved notable successes, they exhibit uneven outcomes. This article examines the efficacy of COIN measures, focusing on challenges and lessons for peacebuilding. It explores the COIN initiatives employed and examines their weaknesses. The article argues that, despite some successes, efforts to curtail the security threat still fall short. The study adopted a mixed-methods approach, incorporating key informant interviews, focus group discussions, surveys, and secondary literature analysis. Qualitative data were gathered through snowball and purposive sampling, while stratified random sampling informed the quantitative strand. Findings indicate the use of diverse counter-insurgency strategies, including military operations, civic engagement, and contributions from intergovernmental and non-governmental actors. These efforts have faced numerous challenges, such as insufficient resources, institutional fragility, corruption, limited economic opportunities for youth employment, and poor coordination between key stakeholders. Given the policy relevance for regional peacebuilding, it is recommended that members of the Alliance des États du Sahel (AES) – Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger – broaden military collaboration beyond their bloc to deter violent extremists from regrouping across borders.

Key words: Collective security, Sahel, counter-insurgency, inter-governmental organisations, Alliance des États du Sahel (AES).